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PREFACE 
The problem of how to  make a "fair division" of resources among 
competing interests arises in many areas of application at  IIASA. One of 
the tasks in the System and Decision Sciences Area is the systematic 
investigation of different criteria of fairness and the formulation of 
allocation procedures based thereon. 
A particular problem of fair division having wide application in 
governmental decision-making is the apportionment problem. An appli- 
cation has recently arisen in the debate over how many seats in the 
European Parliament to allocate to  the different member countries. 
Discussions swirled around particular numbers. over which agreement 
was difficult to achieve. A systematic approach that seeks to  establish 
bases for agreement on the criteria or "principles" for fair division should 
stand a better chance of acceptance in that it represents a scientific or 
system-analytic approach to  the problem. 

ABSTRACT 
It has recently been pointed out that there exists more than one 
house monotone apportionment method satisfying quota. 
This paper gives a simple characterization of d such methods as 
an immediate consequence of the Quota method's existence. Further, 
a manner of exposition is formulated which unites several key house 
monotone apportionment methods. thus clearly showing their connec- 
tions. 

Quobatone Apport ionment  Methods 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
L e t  p = ( p l ,  . . . , p s )  b e  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n s  o f  s s t a t e s ,  where 
e a c h  pi > 0 ,  and h  2 0 t h e  number o f  s e a t s  i n  t h e  house.  The 
- 
problem is  t o  f i n d ,  f o r  any g and a l l  h ,  an  a p p o r t i o n n l e n t  f o r  
h ,  t h a t  i s ,  an s - t u p l e  o f  non-nega t ive  i n t e g e r s  5 = ( a l  , . . . , a s )  
whose sum i s  h.  A s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  problem i s  
t h e r e f o r e  a  f u n c t i o n  f  which t o  e v e r y  p and a l l  h  a s s o c i a t e s  a  
- 
unique  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  f o r  h ,  a i  = f i  ( p , h )  - 0 where l i a i  = h .  
I£  f  i s  a  s o l u t i o n  and h  a  house  s i z e  t h e n  f h  i s  t h e  f u n c t i o n  
h .  f  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h e  domain ( p , h l ) ,  where 0 < h '  ( h .  f 1s 
- - - - 
h  c a l l e d  a  s o l u t i o n  up t o  h  and f  i s  c a l l e d  an  e x t e n s i o n  o f  f  . 
- - 
A s p e c i f i c  appor t ionment  "method" may g i v e  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  
s o l u t i o n s ,  f o r  " t i e s "  may o c c u r  when u s i n g  it, f o r  example when 
two s t a t e s  have i d e n t i c a l  p o p u l a t i o n s .  For  t h i s  r e a s o n  it i s  
u s e f u l  t o  d e f i n e  an a p p o r t i o n m e n t  method M a s  a  non-empty set  o f  
s o l u t i o n s .  A method M i s  t h e  u n i q u e  one  s a t i s f y i n g  g i v e n  prop-  
- 
e r t i e s  i f  any o t h e r  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  s o l u t i o n s  w i t h  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  
i s  a  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  M-so lu t ions .  
- 
L e t  p  = l i p i  b e  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n .  The e x a c t  q u o t a  o f  
s t a t e  j is  q .  ( p , h )  = pjh /p ,  i t s  Lower q u o t a  is  [ q .  ( p , h )  J ( t h e  3 3 
l a r g e s t  i n t e g e r  less t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  q . ) ,  and i t s  u p p e r  q u o t a  3 
i s  r q .  ( p , h )  1 ( t h e  l e a s t  i n t e g e r  g r e a t e r  t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  q .  ) . 
3 - 3 
An a p p o r t i o n m e n t  method i s  s a i d  t o  s a t i s f y  Lower q u o t a  i f ,  f o r  
each  o f  i t s  s o l u t i o n s  f ,  f i  ( p , h )  - 2 [qi ( p , h )  J , t o  s a t i s f y  u p p e r  
q u o t a  i f  f i  ( p , h )  ( rqi ( p , h )  1 ,  and t o  s a t i s f y  q u o t a  i f  it s a t i s -  
f i e s  b o t h  lower  and u p p e r  q u o t a .  A method i s  s a i d  t o  b e  h ~ u s e  
monotone  i f ,  f o r  e a c h  o f  i t s  s o l u t i o n s  - f ,  - -  f  ( p , h + l )  2 f  ( p , h )  . 
A method PI i s  q u o t a t o n e  i f  M i s  house  monotone and s a t i s f i e s  
- - 
q u o t a .  
The e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  q u o t a t o n e  method was f i r s t  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  
[ 1 , 4 ] .  T h i s  method, c a l l e d  t h e  Quota  Method, was a l s o  shown t o  
b e  t h e  u n i q u e  s u c h  method s a t i s f y i n g  a  c e r t a i n  p r o p e r t y  o f  mathe- 
m a t i c a l  c o n s i s t e n c y  ( s u b j e c t  t o  s a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a ) .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  n o t  e v e r y  q u o t a ,  house  monotone appor-  
t i o n m e n t  s o l u t i o n  i s  a  Quota  method s o l u t i o n :  i n d e e d ,  it s u f -  
f i c e s  t o  f i n d  j u s t  one  example  i n  which some Quota  s o l u t i o n  may 
be  " t w i d d l e d "  s l i g h t l y  ( e . g .  by i n t e r c h a n g i n g  t h e  o r d e r  i n  which 
some two s t a t e s  r e c e i v e  s u c c e s s i v e  s e a t s )  w h i l e  s t i l l  s a t i s f y i n g  
house  m o n o t o n i c i t y  and q u o t a .  Of c o u r s e ,  s u c h  s o l u t i o n s  w i l l  
have  a  c e r t a i n  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  a b o u t  them,  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w i l l  
n o t  b e  " c o n s i s t e n t , "  t h u s  v i o l a t i n g  a n  i n t r i n s i c  i d e a  o f  what 
i s  meant by a  "method."  
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  it i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  a s k  how f a r  some a r b i -  
t r a r y ,  q u o t a t o n e  s o l u t i o n  may d e v i a t e  from a Ouata  method s o l u t i o n .  
S t i j l  [ 6 ]  h a s  g i v e n  a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  a l l  such  s o l u t i o n s ;  
h e r e  w e  s h a l l  g i v e  a  s i m p l e r  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  t h a t  r e l a t e s  t h e  
c l a s s  of  q u o t a ,  house monotone s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  Q u o t a  method 
a n d ,  a t  a  f u r t h e r  remove, t o  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  method, J.  - 
2. THE DECK OF CARDS 
Given e we d e f i n e  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  deck ,  D = I ( i , a , p i / a ) ) ,  a s  
- 
a  sequence  o f  " c a r d s , "  e a c h  c a r d  b e a r i n g  t h e  name o f  a  s t a t e  i ,  
a  number o f  s e a t s  a ,  and t h e  a v e r a g e  d i s t r i c t  s i z e  pi/a i f  a  
s e a t s  a r e  a p p o r t i o n e d  t o  s t a t e  i ,  s t a c k e d ,  i n  d e c r e a s i n g  o r d e r ,  
by t h e  vaZues p i / a ,  1  5 i s ,  and a  2 1  i n t e g e r .  
- - 
I n  t h e  s e q u e l  we d r o p  any r e d u n d a n t  ment ion  o f  t h e  popula-  
t i o n s  p.  
- 
Any house  monotone method may b e  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  D a s  
- 
f o l l o w s .  A t  house  s i z e  h  = 0 ,  s e t  a  = 0  and b e g i n  w i t h  t h e  f u l l  
- - 
deck  D = D ( G , O ) .  Given any a p p o r t i o n m e n t  9 f o r  h ,  a n  a p p o r t i o n -  
ment  f o r  h  + 1 i s  found by w i t h d r a w i n g  a  c a r d  o f  form ( i , a i + l ,  
p i / ( a i + l ) )  from t h e  r e m a i n i n g  deck D ( a , h )  and g i v i n g  a i +  1 s e a t s  
- 
t o  s t a t e  i. 
To say  a n  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  a  f o r  h  s a t i s f i e s  lower  q u o t a  i s  
- 
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  s a y i n g  a i  + 1  > pih/p o r  
w h i l e  t o  s a y  a  s a t i s f i e s  upper  q u o t a  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  s a y i n g  
- 
a i -  1  < p i h / p  o r  ( f o r  h  > 0  and  a i  2 1 )  
I n  t h i s  p a p e r  pi/O w i l l  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  h a v i n g  v a l u e  p l u s  i n -  
f i n i t y .  So ,  knowing t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  p/h r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  
d e c k ,  D d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  a p p o r t i o n m e n t s  which s a t i s f y  q u o t a  a t  h .  
- 
3 .  THE JEFFERSON METHOD 
The Jefferson m e t h o d  J [ 3 , 4 ]  may b e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  
- 
(i) f i  ( 0 )  = 0  , 1  i ( s and  D(0,O) = D . 
- - 
(ii) I f  f i  ( h )  = a i l  1  - i 5 - s ,  i s  an  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  f o r  h 
and D ( a , h )  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  d e c k ,  l e t  k  b e  t h e  name o f  
- - 
t h e  s t a t e  o n  t h e  topmos t  c a r d .  Then remove t h a t  c a r d  
and l e t  f k ( h + l )  = a k + l  a n d  f i ( h + l )  = a i  f o r  i f k .  
N o t i c e  t h a t  t h e  number o f  s e a t s  on t h e  d i s c a r d e d  c a r d  i s  p r e -  
c i s e l y  e q u a l  t o  a k +  1 .  H u n t i n g t o n  [5]  d e s c r i b e d  J and c e r t a i n  
- 
o t h e r  methods i n  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h i s  manner.  
J i s  c l e a r l y  house  monotone. I t  a l s o  s a t i s f i e s  l o w e r  q u o t a .  
F o r ,  s u p p o s e  n o t :  t h e n  t h e r e  i s  some s ta te  j  w i t h  p . / ( a . + l )  1 
3 3 
p/h ( s e e  ( 1 ) ) .  Thus p . / a  > p/h and 
I j  
i m p l y h g  p j / ( a . + l )  > p R / a R .  T h i s  i s  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  s i n c e  t h e n  3 
t h e  c a r d  ( j , a . + l , p . / ( a . + l ) )  would h a v e  been chosen  b e f o r e  t h e  
7 3 3 
c a r d  ( R  , a R  , p k / a k )  . 
I t  h a s  been  shown t h a t  house  m o n o t o n i c i t y  and s a t i s f y i n g  
l o w e r  q u o t a  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a  " c o n s i s t e n c y "  p r o p e r t y  ( s e e  S e c t i o n  8 )  
u n i q u e l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  J [ 3 ] .  
4 .  THE QUOTA METHOD 
L e t  U ( a , h )  b e  t h e  se t  of  s t a t e s  which a r e  e l i g i b l e  t o  re- 
- 
c e i v e  an  e x t r a  s e a t  i n  a  h o u s e  o f  s i z e  h +  1  w i t h o u t  v i o l a t i n g  
u p p e r  q u o t a ,  U ( a ,  h )  = i :pi /a- .  > p/ ( h + l  ) 1 .  These  s t a t e s  c a n  
be a s c e r t a i n e d  by l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  o r d e r e d  d e c k  o f  d i s c a r d e d  
c a r d s .  
The Q u o t a  m e t h o d  Q - [ 1 , 4 ]  may b e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  
(i) f i ( 0 )  = 0  , 1  ( i ( s and  D(0,O)  = D . 
- - - 
(ii) I f  f i ( h )  = a .  1 2  i s ,  is  an  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  f o r  h  
1 ' 
and D ( a , h )  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  d e c k ,  l e t  k  b e  t h e  name o f  
t h e  s t a t e  on t h e  t o p m o s t  c a r d  t h a t  b e l o n g s  t o  U ( a , h ) .  
Then,  remove t h a t  c a r d  and l e t  f  ( h + l )  = a  + 1  and k  k 
f i ( h + l )  = a  f o r  i # k .  i 
It h a s  been  shown t h a t  h o u s e  m o n o t o n i c i t y  and s a t i s f y i n g  
q u o t a  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a  weakened " c o n s i s t e n c y "  p r o p e r t y  u n i q u e l y  
c h a r a c t e r i z e  Q [ 4 ] .  
- 
5. QUOTATONE METHODS 
L e t  D b e  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  d e c k .  F o r  any  h o u s e  h  2 0 and  ap- 
- 
p o r t i o n m e n t  5 f o r  h  l e t  a ( a , h )  b e  t h e  first i n t e g e r  a  2 1  s u c h  
- 
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  a t  l e a s t  a  c a r d s  i n  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  deck  D ( a , h )  
- - 
w i t h  v a l u e  > p / ( h + a ) ,  and l e t  L ( a , h )  b e  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  s t a t e  
- 
names a p p e a r i n g  on t h e  f i r s t  a ( ? , h )  c a r d s .  I f  n o  s u c h  a  e x i s t s  
t h e n  set  a = m and l e t  L ( a , h )  b e  t h e  set o f  a l l  s t a t e s  ( n o t  a l l  
- 
a  need  b e  c h e c k e d ;  see b e l o w ) .  
The meaning o f  a  = a ( a , h )  i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  i f  a  < m ,  
* 
s t  f  ( p ,  h )  = i s  some a p p o r t i o n m e n t  a t  h ,  and  t h e  ( h + l  ) s e a t  i s  
- - 
g i v e n  t o  some s t a t e  k $ L ( ? , h ) ,  t h e n  t h e r e  c a n  b e  no monotone 
e x t e n s i o n  g  o f  f h  s u c h  t h a t  9 s a t i s f i e s  l o w e r  q u o t a  a t  h o u s e  
h  + a .  The r ea son  i s  t h a t  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  by CJ o f  e ach  s e a t  from 
h  + 1  t o  h  + a cor responds  t o  t h e  removal o f  a  c a r d  from t h e  re- 
maining deck ,  s o  (by c h o i c e  of  a )  a t  h  + a  t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  a t  
l e a s t  one  c a r d  remaining co r r e s pond ing  t o  some s t a t e  j E L ( a , h )  
- 
and hav ing  v a l u e  p  . / b  > p/ (h+a)  . Now, s i n c e  a t  h  + a  s t a t e  j 
3 - 
has  b '  < b  s e a t s  w e  have 
which shows by ( 1 )  t h a t  s t a t e  j v i o l a t e s  lower quo t a  a t  h  + a .  
T h e r e f o r e  i f  f i s  a  q u o t a t o n e  appor t ionment  s o l u t i o n ,  t h e n  f  
- 
s a t i s f i e s  
(ii) i f  f ( p , h )  = a  and f k ( p , h + l )  = a k +  1 ,  t hen  
- - -  - 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  a ( a , h )  was t o  de t e r mine  which s t a t e s  
- 
belonged  t o  L ( a , h ) .  I f  t h e r e  i s  no " f i r s t "  a ,  t hen  a l l  s t a t e s  
- 
must be long  t o  L ( a , h ) .  I t  i s  c l e a r l y  unnecessary  t o  i n s p e c t  
v a l u e s  of a  l a r g e r  t han  t h o s e  which a s s u r e  t h a t  eve r y  c a r d  o f  
form (i , a i+ l  ,p i /  (a i+l  ) ) ha s  v a l u e  g r e a t e r  t han  o r  e q u a l  t o  
p / ( h + a ) .  Def ine ,  t h e n ,  Bi t o  b e  t h e  l e a s t  p o s i t i v e  i n t e g e r  
s a t i s f y i n g  p i / ( a i + l )  2 p/(h+Bi) , t h a t  i s  Bi = Ip (a i+ l  ) / p i  - hl 
and B = maxiBi. Then L ( a , h )  may be d e f i n e d  a s  b e f o r e  w i t h  t h i s  
- 
m o d i f i c a t i o n :  i f  t h e r e  i s  no f i r s t  i n t e g e r  B > a  2 1 f o r  which 
a t  l e a s t  a  c a r d s  i n  g ( a , h )  have va lue  2 p / ( h + a ) ,  t h e n  l e t  L ( a , h )  
- - 
be  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  s t a t e s .  
Le t  Q be  t h e  c l a s s  o f  a l l  s o l u t i o n s  f  s a t i s f y i n g  (i) and 
-. 
(ii) .  
- 
Theorem I .  Q i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  q u o t a t o n e  
- 
s o l u t i o n s .  
P r o o f .  W e  know t h a t  e v e r y  q u o t a t o n e  s o l u t i o n  i s  i n  GI hence 
Q C I?. F u r t h e r ,  e v e r y  f E s a t i s f i e s  upper  q u o t a ,  by d e f i n i t i o n .  
Suppose f ( p , h + l )  = b  v i o l a t e s  lower  q u o t a  a t  h  + 1  f o r  s t a t e  k .  
- - - 
Then p k / ( b k + l )  2 p / ( h + l )  by ( 1 1 ,  and c a r d  do  = ( k , b k + l , p k / ( b k + l )  
i s  i n  D ( b , h + l ) ,  hence  a l s o  i n  D (f ( h )  , h )  . T h e r e f o r e  a  ( f  ( h )  , h )  = 1  , 
- - 
hence  t h e  ( h + l )  c a r d  removed, dh+l  , a l s o  had v a l u e  g;eater 
t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  p / ( h + l ) ,  and dh+l # d o .  Hence a ( f ( h - l ) , h - 1 )  - < 2 
s o  dh ( t h e  hth c a r d  removed) had v a l u e  g r e a t e r  t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  
p / ( h + l ) .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  a ( f ( h 8 ) , h ' )  + h '  ( h + l  f o r  h '  2 h ,  and i n  
- 
D - t h e r e  were h  + 2 c a r d s  d o , d l , . . . d h + l  w i t h  v a l u e s  _> p / ( h + l ) .  
But t h e n  no house  monotone s o l u t i o n  c a n  s a t i s f y  q u o t a  a t  h  + 1 ,  
c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
_> Q # 4.0 
Thus e v e r y  q u o t a t o n e  s o l u t i o n  i s  a  v a r i a n t  o f  a  Quota method 
s o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e n s e :  i n s t e a d  of  g i v i n g  t h e  a d d i -  
t i o n a l  s e a t  a t  each  s u c c e s s i v e  house t o  t h e  f i r s t  s t a t e  s a t i s -  
f y i n g  upper  q u o t a ,  g i v e  it t o  some s t a t e  s a t i s f y i n g  upper  q u o t a  
among t h e  f i r s t  a  s t a t e s .  The problem i s  t o  d e c i d e  w h i c h  o f  t h e  
a  s t a t e s  t o  s e l e c t :  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  o n e  ( s a t i s f y i n g  
upper  q u o t a )  t u r n s  o u t  t o  b e  t h e  o n l y  r e s o l u t i o n  t h a t  i s  "con- 
s i s t e n t "  (see S e c t i o n  8 )  s u b j e c t  t o  s a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a .  
6 .  GENERALIZED LOWER QUOTA 
I t  is  n e c e s s a r y  t o  g e n e r a l i z e  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  methods and 
theorems  t o  t h e  need f o r  any a d m i s s i b l e  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  a  t o  s a t -  
-. 
i s f y  c e r t a i n  minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s  r = (r l  .. . , rS) , where t h e  - 
i n t e g e r  r .  2 0  i s  t h e  minimum number o f  s e a t s  which must  be  
1 - 
a c c o r d e d  t o  s t a t e  i by mandate .  L e t t i n g  h* = l iri l  an  a p p o r -  
t i o n m e n t  f o r  h  2 h* i s  an n - t u p l e  o f  i n t e g e r s  a  = ( a .  
- .  , a s )  I 
- 
w i t h  a  2 r and l i a i  = h .  A s o Z u t i o n  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  f ( p , r , h )  
- 
- - - 
which t o  e v e r y  p  and r ,  and a l l  h  2 h* = liri, a s s o c i a t e s  a  u n i q u e  
- 
a p p o r t i o n m e n t  f o r  h ,  a i  = f i ( p , r , h )  2 r i r  where  l i a i  = h .  The 
c o n c e p t s  method ,  e x t e n s i o n ,  s o Z u t i o n  u p  t o  h  a r e  d e f i n e d  a n a l o -  
g o u s l y  t o  t h e  p u r e  (r=O) c a s e .  
I t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e ,  f o r  c e r t a i n  v a l u e s  E, t o  a s k  f o r  s o l u t i o n s  
s a t i s f y i n g  quo ta .  Thus, t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  must be modi f ied .  The 
mo t iva t ion  i s  t h i s .  Suppose t h e  e x a c t  quota  of s t a t e  i a t  h  i s  
l e s s  t han  o r  equa l  t o  ri: t hen  it dese rves  no more t han  ri s e a t s ,  
b u t  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e c e i v e  a t  l e a s t  ri s e a t s ,  The re fo re ,  we 
r ea son ,  it  should  r e c e i v e  e x a c t l y  ri s e a t s ,  and we say  i t s  lower 
and upper  quota  should  be e x a c t l y  r El imina t e  t h e s e  s t a t e s  i '  
whose apport ionment  i s  f i x e d ,  and s u b t r a c t  t h e  cor responding  r i 's  
from h  = ho t o  o b t a i n  h l  s e a t s  which must be d i s t r i b u t e d  among 
t h e  remaining s t a t e s .  Using t h i s  s m a l l e r  house h l ,  compute 
e x a c t  q u o t a s ,  t h a t  i s ,  compute t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  s h a r e  of h l  t h a t  
each of t h e  remaining s t a t e s  dese rves ,  and i t e r a t e .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  l e t  Jo = Jo (h )  = I1 , . . . , s 1 ,  ho  = h ( - 2 h*) and 
d e f i n e  J l  = J ,  ( h )  = i i  E J ; p . h  / I  p j  > ril  and hl = ho - li$Jlri. 0 1 0  Jo 
I n  g e n e r a l ,  J B + l  - J ~ + ~  (h )  = { i  E ~ ~ ; ~ ~ h ~ / l ~  p j  > r i j  and h  = 
B B+ 1 
"0 - l i $ J B t l  r < h t h e  p roces s  s topp ing  wi th  J when J = J . i B '  P P+ 1 P 
Thus, JO ( h ) 3  J1 ( h ) 3  ... 3 J  ( h )  = J ( h )  and h  = ho > h l > .  . . > h P r  w i th  
P 
p . h  /IJ p j  > ri f o r  ~ E J  = J . We d e f i n e  t h e  ( g e n e r a l i z e d )  
l U  P P 
e x a c t  quota qi ( p , r , h )  o f  s t a t e  i t o  be 
- - 
qi ( p , r , h )  = r f o r  i $ J ( h )  i 
Thus, t h e  ( g e n e r a l i z e d )  lower quota of  s t a t e  i i s  P,. ( h )  = 
1 
lqi ( p l r , h l  -. - and t h e  ( g e n e r a l i z e d )  upper quota i s  u i ( h )  = lqi ( P ,  
h 1 . This  means, i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h a t  R i  ( h )  = ui (h )  = ri f o r  
- 
i $  J ( h ) .  Note t h a t  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  s l i g h t l y  more n a t u r a l  
t han  t h a t  g iven  p r e v i o u s l y  i n  [ 4 ]  and s i r n p l i f i e s  t h e  proof of 
Theorem 4 i n  t h a t  paper .  
There i s  a  more d i r e c t  way o f  computing J ( h ) .  By d e f i n i t i o n ,  
p . h  /IJ p .  5 ri f o r  i E J B -  JB+, , O ( B < U .  1 B  6 1 -  
T h e r e f o r e ,  
and  s o  
From t h i s  and ( 3 )  w e  deduce 
( 4 )  pi / r i  > IJ ( h )  'j 2 pk/ rk  f o r  a l l  i E J ( h )  , k  $ J ( h )  
h -  h * +  l J ( h ) r j  
But ( 4 )  u n i q u e l y  d e t e r m i n e s  J ( h )  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o c e d u r e .  
Suppose,  f o r  s i m p l i c i t y ,  p l / r l  2 p2/r2' ... 'ps/rs. Given h  and 
h*, c o n s i d e r  X 1  = p l /  (h - h* + r l ) .  I f  X 1  2 p 2 / r 2 ,  s t o p ,  J ( h )  = 
I1 3 .  O t h e r w i s e ,  c o n s i d e r  X 2  = ( p l  + p 2 ) /  (h  - h* + r l  + r2 )  > X I .  
I£ X 2  2 p3/r3 ,  s t o p ,  J ( h )  = { 1 , 2 } .  O t h e r w i s e ,  c o n t i n u e  s i m i -  
l a r l y .  
D e f i n e  U ( a , h )  t o  b e  t h e  set  o f  s t a t e s  e l i g i b l e  t o  r e c e i v e  
- 
an  e x t r a  s e a t  i n  a  house o f  s i z e  h +  1  w i t h o u t  v i o l a t i n g  [gener -  
a l i z e d )  upper  q u o t a ,  U ( a , h )  - = { i : a i  + 1  5 ui ( h + l )  1 .  Then t h e  
( g e n e r a l i z e d )  Q u o t a  m e t h o d  Q ( r )  [ l  , 3 ]  w i t h  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i s  e x a c t -  
- - 
l y  t h e  same a s  Q - e x c e p t  t h a t  f i  (p , r ,h ' )  = ri f o r  a l l  i ,  and 
D ( a , h * )  i s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  deck  D from which h a s  been e l i m i n a t e d  
- - - 
a l l  c a r d s  ( i , a , p i / a )  w i t h  a  ( ri f o r  a l l  i. 
S t i l l  161 a t t a c k s  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  g e n e r a l i z e d  lower  q u o t a  
because  it " a d m i t s  a p p o r t i o n m e n t s "  n o t  s a t i s f y i n g  p u r e  lower  
q u o t a  "even though ... no v i o l a t i o n  o f  p u r e  lower  q u o t a  i s  n e c e s s a r y  
t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s . "  The f o l l o w i n g  theorem shows 
h i s  o b j e c t i o n  t o  b e  i n a p p l i c a b l e .  
Theorem  2 .  I f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an a p p o r t i o n m e n t  a t  h  s a t i s f y i n g  
p u r e  l o w e r  q u o t a  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  %-apport ionment  which does  so .  
P r o o f .  Suppose t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a n  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  a t  some 
h 1 ( > h * =  - 1 . r . )  which s a t i s f i e s  p u r e  l o w e r  q u o t a s .  Then, s u r e l y ,  
1 1  Ii max t lpih ' / P I  ,ri1 2 h '  , where p  = l ip i .  
L e t  p  = IiPi. Suppose a  i s  a  Q-apportionment which d o e s  n o t  
- - 
s a t i s f y  a .  > 1 p . h 1 / p l  f o r  a l l  i. Then t h e r e  e x i s t s  j  such  t h a t  
1 =  1 
a  < l p  . h ' / p ]  , whence p .  / ( a .  + 1 ) 2 p/h '  , and t h e r e f o r e  t h e r e  must j  3 3 3 - 
be  some R w i t h  a R  > p R h l / p .  
L e t  L = { k ;  a k > p k h l / p }  # +, and R = t i ;  r i , p i h l / p } .  For  
any i g! L  we have  a i  ( Lpihl/p] ; i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  a .  < 1 p j h f / p 1 .  3 
F u r t h e r ,  i f  we assume L C R  t h e n  
c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a  i s  a n  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  f o r  h ' .  Thus,  
- 
t h e r e  e x i s t s  R E  L -  R, t h a t  i s ,  a  s t a t e  f o r  which a R  > p R h V / p  > rR ,  
i m p l y i n g  
L e t  ha  b e  t h e  house a t  which s t a t e  R r e c e i v e d  i t s  apth s e a t ;  
and c h o o s e  R E L -  R such  t h a t  ha i s  l a r g e s t .  C l e a r l y  h R <  h ' ,  s i n c e  
s t a t e  j  i s  e l i g i b l e  t o  r e c e i v e  an e x t r a  s e a t  a t  h ' .  L e t  
K = t i ;  s t a t e  i r e c e i v e d  a  s e a t  a t  h ,  h l l < h ( h o }  . 
By c h o i c e  o f  !L, R $ K .  
Suppose k~ K and a k  > p k h f / p ;  t h e n  k c  L  and kg!R,  b u t  hk > 
h R ,  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e ,  k  E K i m p l i e s  
However, fk(hR) < ak for k E K, and SO 
showing that k~ K is ineligible at hR, that is, 
But, in the interval hR < h 5 - h' exactly h' -hR seats were 
awarded to states in K, so lK{fk (h') - fk(hR) I = h' - hR. 
Subtracting (6) from (5) , then summing over K, 
implying, since h' -hR > 0, that lKPk/P 2 1, a contradiction 
since R$K. This completes the proof. 
Still's definition [6] of generalized lower quota R(h) may 
- 
be given as follows. k (h* ) = f .  For h > h* , let (h) be de- 
1 fined by Pi(h) = maxi lii(h)] , Ri (h-1) I, and h1 = lRi(h). In 
general, if hB > h then let pBtl (h) be defined by Rktl (h) = 
B B 
m a  { R  (h) - 1 , R - 1  1 .  Otherwise, if h 5 - h, then R (h) = 
- 
RB(h). Thus Still successively reduces the pure lower quota of 
e v e r y  s t a t e  that can be reduced without going below the previous 
generalized lower quota. This is n o t  a prcportionally motivated 
scheme; in fact, it tends to consistently favor large states ver- 
sus small states, as the example of Table 1 illustrates. It 
must be realized that a definition of generalized lower quota 
imposes de facto a method of apportionment for "small" house 
sizes, so this non-proportional bias is important. The Ri(h) 
for h = 20,21,22,23,24,25, and 27 sum to h; hence the lower 
quotas are in these cases the only admissible apportionments for 
h which belong to Still's class of methods. Consider, in partic- 
ular, h = 27. The lower quotas force an apportionment with 
R 2 2 / R 2 1  = a 2 2 / a 2 1  = 6 whereas  p22 /p21  = 1.9925.  T h i s  i s  t h e  
r e s u l t  o f  n e g l e c t i n g  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  i n  d e f i n i n g  lower  q u o t a s .  
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  approach  t o  lower  q u o t a s  a t  h  = 27 
g i v e s  R ( 2 7 )  = ( 1 , 1 ,  ..., 1 , 2 , 4 ) ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  R 2 2 / R 2 1  = 2. 
- 
T h i s  a n a l y s i s  a l s o  shows t h a t  t h e  Quota method w i t h  minimum re- 
q u i r e m e n t s  d o e s  n o t  b e l o n g  t o  S t i l l ' s  c l a s s .  However, S t i l l ' s  
g e n e r a l i z e d  lower  q u o t a  c o n c e p t  h a s  no i n t u i t i v e  a p p e a l ,  s o  we 
b e l i e v e  h i s  c l a s s  i s  n o t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  o n e  t o  c o n s i d e r .  In -  
s t e a d ,  we g e n e r a l i z e  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  q u o t a ,  house  monotone 
methods g i v e n  i n  S e c t i o n  5  f o r  o u r  lower  q u o t a  d e f i n i t i o n .  
T a b l e  1 .  S t i l l ' s  lower  q u o t a s .  
State p 
7 .  GENERALIZED QUOTATONE METHODS 
Given minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s  ( r l  ,. . . , rS)  = r ,  l e t  h *  = 1 ri,  
i 
and f o r  any  h  2 h *  l e t  R i ( h ) ,  u i ( h )  b e  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  l o w e r  
and upper  q u o t a s  f o r  s t a t e  i, and J ( h )  t h e  set o f  " s l a c k "  s t a t e s .  
Then a n  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  a  f o r  h  s a t i s f i e s  f g e n e r a Z i z e d l  q u o t a  i f  
- 
and o n l y  i f  f o r  e a c h  i ,  ui ( h )  2 a i  R i  ( h )  , and a  f 
s a t i s f i e s  q u o t a  i f  a l l  i t s  a p p o r t i o n m e n t s  do .  W e  n o t e  t h a t ,  
f o r  i J ( h )  , a i  2 Ri(h) i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
For  any g iven  h  2 0 and any appor t ionment  a f o r  h  c o n s i d e r  
t h e  J e f f e r s o n  deck D ( a ,  - h)  remaining a f t e r  a l l  c a r d s  ( i , a j  , p i / a j )  , 
0 2 a j  5 a i l  a r e  removed. Def ine  a  = a ( a , h )  t o  b e  t h e  first 
i n t e g e r  a  2 3 such t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  a t  l e a s t  a  d i s t i n c t  c a r d s  i n  
D ( a ,  h )  hav ing  va lue  2 I p j /  ( ( h  - h*) + 1 r + a )  , and l e t  
- - J(h+cr) J ( h + a )  j 
L ( a , h )  be  t h e  set  o f  a l l  s t a t e  names appea r ing  on t h e  f i r s t  a  
- 
c a r d s .  I f  no such  a  e x i s t s  t h e n  set  a  = and l e t  ~ ( a , h )  b e  
t h e  set  of a l l  s t a t e s  (see below) .  
Suppose t h a t  f ( p , h )  = a i s  some appor t ionment  a t  h ,  and 
t h e  (h+l ) S t  s e a t  i s  g ive n  t o  some s t a t e  k  $ L ( a , h )  . Then a  < rnr 
and i n  c a n s t r u c t i n g  a  house monotone e x t e n s i o n  of f h  e x a c t l y  a  
c a r d s  must be  removed i n  go ing  from h + l  t o  h + a .  By c h o i c e  of  
a  t h e r e  remains a t  h +  a  some c a r d  ( j , b  , p j / b j )  w i t h  v a l u e  j  
and s i n c e  s t a t e  j h a s  fewer  t h a n  b .  s e a t s  a t  h  + a ,  it f o l l o w s  
3 
from ( 7 )  t h a t  lower quo t a  a t  h +  a  i s  v i o l a t e d .  Hence i f  _f i s  
a  house monotone apport ionment  s o l u t i o n  s a t i s f y i n g  quota  ( f o r  
t h e  g iven  requi rements  r ) ,  t h en  we must have 
- 
(i) f (h*)  = E ; 
and 
(ii) i f  f ( h )  = a  and f k ( h + l )  = ak + 1 ,  
- - 
t h e n  
k  E L ( a , h ) n  U(a ,h )  . 
A t  t h i s  p o i n t  w e  n o t e  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a  = a ( a , h ) ,  
it i s  unneccesary t o  i n s p e c t  v a l u e s  of a  l a r g e r  t h a n  t h o s e  which 
a s s u r e  t h a t  t h e  c a r d s  ( i , a i + l , p i / ( a i + l ) )  have v a l u e  
pi/(ai+l) 2 1 pj/((.h-h*) + 1 r.+a) for each i, 1 z i  
J (h+l ) JCh+l) 
< s, since for any a 2 1, ~(h+l) J(h+a), and by (4) 
- 
Hence if we define 
then L (5,h) may be defined as above with the modification: if 
there is no first integer a in the range B > a 1 satisfying the 
condition, let L (a,h) - be the set of all states. 
Let Q(r) be the class of all solutions f satisfying (i) 
- - - 
and (ii). 
- 
Theorem 3. Q(r) is precisely the set of all quotatone 
solutions for the requirements r .  
The proof parallels that of Theorem 1. 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Two fundamental properties of apportionment methods are 
dictated by common sense and firmly grounded in the history 
of the problem: house monotonicity and satisfying quota. 
Following the idea of Still that the class of all methods 
having these two properties are in some sense describable, we 
have shown that in fact they may all be described by using the 
Jefferson deck and choosing a card "near the top" that satisfies 
upper quota. If minimum requirements are given, we have shown 
that the quota idea has a natural generalization, and that the 
class of all house monotone (generalized) quota methods is again 
describable in a natural way in terms of the Jefferson deck. 
By contrast, the approach to generalized quotas proposed by 
Still, and the methods corresponding to them, were shown to 
lead to unnatural results. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  a p p o r t i o n -  
ment methods which s a t i s f y  t h e  above two p r o p e r t i e s ,  t h e  problem 
remains :  which among t h e s e  methods s h o u l d  b e  used?  H e r e  a  t h i r d  
p r i n c i p l e  comes i n t o  p l a y ,  which h a s  i t s  b a s i s  i n  t h e  p i o n e e r i n g  
work on appor t ionment  methods by E.V.  Hunt ing ton  i n  t h e  e a r l y  
p a r t  o f  t h i s  c e n t u r y  [ 5 1  and t o u c h e s  on  t h e  i d e a  o f  what i s  
meant i n t u i t i v e l y  by "method". B r i e f l y  s t a t e d ,  i f  f o r  some 
problem and M-solut ion f  one  s t a t e ,  h a v i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  p and a 
- - 
s e a t s  a t  house  h ,  g e t s  t h e  " n e x t "  ( i .e .  ( h + l l s t )  s e a t  b e f o r e  
a n o t h e r  s t a t e  hav ing  p o p u l a t i o n  p* and a *  s e a t s ,  t h e n  t h e  f i r s t  
s t a t e  h a s  p r i o r i t y  o v e r  t h e  second  s t a t e ,  w r i t t e n  (p,a) 2 ( p * , a * )  . 
I f  i n  a n o t h e r  problem we a l s o  have  ( p * , a * )  2 (p ,a) ,  t h e n  w e  s a y  
t h e  s t a t e s  a r e  t i e d ,  w r i t t e n  ( p * , a * )  - (p,a). The method M is  
s a i d  t o  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  i f  it t r e a t s  t i e d  s t a t e s  e q u a l l y  w i t h  re- 
s p e c t  t o  r e c e i v i n g  one  more s e a t ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h e r e  must b e  an  
a l t e r n a t e  M-solut ion f '  which i s  an  e x t e n s i o n  o f  f h  and g i v e s  
t h e  (h+l  ) s t  s e a t  i n s t e a d  t o  t h e  p * - s t a t e .  The e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  
i d e a  i s  t h a t  a  "method" s h o u l d  n o t  change p r i o r i t i e s  between a  
p a i r  o f  s t a t e s  i f  t h e  d a t a  o f  some o t h e r  s t a t e  p o p u l a t i o n s  a r e  
a l t e r e d .  
The f i v e  methods p roposed  by H u n t i n g t o n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e i r  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  [ 2 ] ,  a l l  have t h i s  p r o p e r t y .  Moreover it may 
be shown t h a t  e v e r y  house monotone, c o n s i s t e n t  method i s  n e c e s -  
s a r i l y  a  Hunt ing ton  method, t h a t  i s ,  u s e s  a  " rank  index"  r ( p , a )  
t h a t  t e l l s  which s t a t e  ( w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n  p  and number of s e a t s  
a )  most  d e s e r v e s  t o  r e c e i v e  one more s e a t .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
and 
(ii) i f  f ( h )  - = 5 and k  i s  some one s t a t e  maximizing 
r ( p k I a k ) ,  t h e n  
f k ( h + l )  = a k + l  , f i ( h + l )  = a i  a l l  i 9 k  . 
The d e s i r a b l e  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e s e  methods a r e :  f i r s t ,  t h e y  
a r e  e m i n e n t l y  computable ,  and second ,  t h e y  a r e  b a s e d  on t h e  
n a t u r a l  i d e a  of comparing t h e  s t a t e s  p a i r w i s e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
which i s  w o r s t  o f f ,  hence most d e s e r v i n g  o f  an e x t r a  s e a t .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  none of t h e  Hunt ing ton  methods s a t i s f i e s  
q u o t a  [ 4  I . 
Given t h e  p r e c e d e n t - - i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t - -  o f  t h e  
two p r i n c i p l e s ,  house  monoton ic i ty  and s a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a ,  it is  
n a t u r a l  t o  a s k  whe ther  t h e r e  i s  some m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  con- 
s i s t e n c y  c o n c e p t  t h a t  l e a d s  t o  a  c o m p u t a t i o n a l l y  s i m p l e  method. 
Indeed t h e r e  is .  L e t  c o n s i s t e n c y  be m o d i f i e d  t o  a p p l y  between 
p a i r s  o f  s t a t e s  o n l y  when bo th  s t a t e s  a r e  e l i g i b l e  ( i . e .  b o t h  
a r e  i n  U ( a , h ) ) .  Then t h e  Q u o t a  method i s  t h e  u n i q u e  method 
- 
t h a t  i s  q u o t a ,  house monotone, and c o n s i s t e n t  i n  t h i s  weaker 
s e n s e  [ 4 ] .  (Note t h a t  w i t h  t h e  p r e s e n t  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  g e n e r a l -  
i z e d  upper  q u o t a s ,  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  i n  [4]  t o  u n b i a s e d  r e q u i r e -  
ments is  u n n e c e s s a r y . )  Moreover it i s  c l e a r  from t h e  p r e c e d i n g  
t h a t  t h e  Q u o t a  method Q is  t h e  c o m p u t a t i o n a l l y  s i m p l e s t  and most 
- 
n a t u r a l  w i t h i n  t h e  c l a s s  5. I f  t h e  concep t  i s  weakened s t i l l  
- 
f u r t h e r  t o  a p p l y  o n l y  between p a i r s  o f  s t a t e s  t h a t  a r e  b o t h  
e l i g i b l e  and among t h e  f i r s t  a ( a , h )  s t a t e s ,  t h a t  is  i n  L ( a , h ) n  
- - 
U ( a , h ) ,  t h e n  w e  may e x p e c t  t h a t  t h i s  p r o p e r t y ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
house m o n o t o n i c i t y  and s a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a ,  d e t e r m i n e s  p r e c i s e l y  
t h e  c l a s s  o f  methods d e f i n e d  a s  f o l l o w s .  
L e t  r ( p , a )  b e  a  rank  index  and l e t  r b e  a  g i v e n  set  o f  
-. 
minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  h *  = r . .  Def ine  t h e  q u o t a t o n e  method 
1 = 
M b a s e d  on  r ( p , a )  t o  b e  t h e  set of a l l  s o l u t i o n s  o b t a i n e d  a s  
- 
f o l l o w s .  For  any r ,  
(i) f ( h * )  = ; 
- 
(ii) i f  f ( h )  = a  and k  is  some one s t a t e  t h a t  maximizes 
-. - 
r ( p k r a k )  o v e r  a l l  k  E L C a , h ) n  U ( a , h )  t h e n  l e t  
- - 
Thus, f o r  example,  Q - i s  t h e  q u o t a t o n e  method basen  on p / ( a + l ) .  
Among the class of all such methods Q is the simplest and 
- 
most natural, since it does not depend on the computation of 
L(a,h), which in general is complex. Furthermore, although 
- 
computers make possible the calculation of quotatone apportion- 
ments for any rank-index, it is nevertheless of paramount impor- 
tance that political men both understand and feel comfortable 
with any method that is used. It may be that the set L(a,h) is 
- 
simply beyond political understanding. 
There are several criteria which are clearly of primary 
importance in choosing an apportionment method: satisfying quota, 
house monotonicity, consistency, and "simplicity." The de- 
siderata cannot be met simultaneously. The question is to find 
a satisfactory reconciliation. Consistency and house monoton- 
icity determine Huntington methods, which are simple but do not 
satisfy quota. A slightly weakened consistency notion together 
with satisfying quota gives the Quota method, which has an in- 
tuitive simplicity. A considerably weakened consistency idea 
leads to quotatone methods based on some r(p,a) which, it seems, 
have mathematical appeal but lack simplicity. 
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